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This thesis addresses the historic debate between natural law theorists and
positivists. After providing a foundation for the debate by discussing the thirteenth
century natural law theory of St. Thomas Aquinas and the criticisms of it by positivist
philosopher John Austin, this thesis turns to the theory of H.L.A. Hart. My primary aim
is to outline a defense of the soft positivism of H.L.A. Hart in face of the criticisms of
Ronald Dworkin by appealing to two nonexclusive roots of moral principles in the law:
justice and criminal law.
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Introduction:
A Defense of Soft Positivism: Justice and Principle Processes
Keith W. Diener
The controversy between natural law theorists and positivists is one of the most
recognized ongoing debates in contemporary jurisprudence. Natural law theories can be
traced to the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century who claimed there
is a necessary connection between law and morality. His theory came under attack in the
nineteenth century by positivist philosopher, John Austin who claimed there is no
necessary connection between law and morality. Chapter I lays out the important aspects
of Aquinas’s natural law theory, Austin’s criticisms of natural law and his positivism
(i.e., command theory), as well as H.L.A. Hart’s criticisms of Austin’s command theory.
Hart renames command theory as the coercive orders theory and proceeds to
develop his own theory of positivism based on rules rather than commands. His theory
has come to be known as soft positivism because, though denying a necessary connection
between law and morality, he asserts that there sometimes are connections between
morality and the law. Hart’s theory is outlined in Chapter II.
Chapter III covers the attack on Hart’s positivism as rendered by his former
student, Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin reasserts that there is a necessary connection
between law and morality by the exemplification of moral principles in Anglo-American
case law. After arguing that positivism cannot remain coherent given these principles,
chapter three also covers Dworkin’s moral theory of law, or, law as integrity.
Chapter IV deals with Hart’s posthumously published response to Dworkin’s
allegations that positivism cannot remain coherent given the existence of moral principles
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in the law, as found in his Postscript.1 Hart agrees that there are moral principles in the
law though they are not conceptually necessary elements of a system of law. Hart further
asserts that positivism can remain coherent while accepting their presence in the law.
The final chapter, Chapter V, shows how two nonexclusive historical roots of
moral principles can explain Dworkin’s sample cases in terms of the theory of Hart. It
asserts that Hart’s theory remains coherent in face of Dworkin’s criticisms by tracing the
many processes undergone by these moral principles and evaluating the Constitutional
principle of justice in light of David Schmidtz’s theory of justice. After addressing a
number of objections to this defense of positivism, I conclude that soft positivism
remains coherent despite the existence of moral principles in the law.2
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Chapter I: The Turn from Natural Law to Positivism
Keith W. Diener

I. Aquinas’s Natural Law:
Natural Law theory is largely rooted in the thirteenth century writings of Saint
Thomas Aquinas. The central tenet of natural law theory is that there is a necessary
connection between law and morality. Law, for Aquinas is a “certain rational plan and
rule of operation,” and is a measure of human activity as “law is something pertaining to
reason.”3 Aquinas’s view is considered the traditional version of natural law theory
wherein legal rules that conflict with natural law are considered invalid. Such rules are
considered to impose no legal obligation on anyone because natural law principles, in
effect, trump immoral positive law rendering it void. Natural law is still a widely
considered view today, though none have developed as systematic and precise a vision as
Aquinas. Aquinas’s theory rests on four tiers of law: the highest being eternal law,
followed by natural law, with divine law in between natural and eternal law, and finally
human law: each of these tiers is under the supreme judge, God.
Eternal law is composed of principles of both action and motion that allow each
thing to function in accord with their role in the universe, as designed by God. The good
and the bad are then relative to the proper function of each thing: if something enables the
thing to perform its function then it is good and if it does not, then it is bad. The “blessed
and the damned are under eternal law,”4 the highest law- Aquinas asserted that
everything, “whether contingent or necessary, is subject to the eternal law.”5 It is God’s
law and everyone, whether intelligent or dumb, whether righteous or wicked, is subject to
eternal law.
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Natural law is composed of the eternal law principles that are particular to human
beings. The rational creature, “has a share of the eternal reason, whereby it has a natural
inclination to its proper act and end; and this participation of the eternal law in the
rational creature is called the natural law.”6 Natural law principles are known through
human reason which acts as a compass, guiding us to what is good. The good is harmony
and peace among humans so natural law principles prohibit activities that would
degenerate peace, such as murder and theft. Through obedience to this natural law
humans can attain what is good (their function), so generally there is an obligation to act
in accord with natural law.
By following natural law, humans will be able to achieve the good that is
attainable in this world, though to attain eternal salvation, the good in the world to come,
humans must also follow divine law. “The end of the divine law is to bring man to that
end which is everlasting happiness”; the divine law is the law that will lead to eternal
salvation in the life to come.7 The divine laws, for Aquinas, are primarily enunciated in
the scripture, a combination of the New and Old Testaments of the Bible.
Human law is the law posited by some lawmaker of a human community. It is
aimed at the common good of the members of the community and as such is derived from
natural law. Aquinas notes their relation, claiming that “every human law has just so
much of the nature of law as it is derived from the law of nature.”8

The general

principles of natural law are specified according to the conditions of mankind via human
law. For instance, actions that prevent peace would be punishable under human law
(once they are accepted as actions that prevent peace or harm mankind).
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If a human law comes into conflict with natural law, then the human law would be
considered unjust and thus not a law at all. Human reason allows one to know if the laws
are just or not: “in so far as it [a law] deviates from reason, it is called an unjust law, and
has the nature, not of law but of violence.”9 These unjust laws create no obligation to
obey and no legal authority. Unjust laws are not to be obeyed absent exigent
circumstances, such as when the common good is temporarily dependent upon obeying
an unjust law.10

II. Critique of Aquinas’s Natural Law Theory:
Aquinas’s natural law theory has fallen into disrepute for a number of reasons
including the arguments provided against it by John Austin in the nineteenth century.
The obvious criticism of Aquinas’s theory is that it assumes there is a God, moreover,
that this God and his will can be known by humans. There has been a modern trend to
secularize legal theories because of the uncertainties and disagreements over the
existence of god and his will; few will make an exception for natural law. Austin,
however, opposed natural law theory for more practical reasons.
Austin believes the claim that unjust laws are not laws, or laws that come in
conflict with natural law are not laws, is a mistaken assessment. Laws, no matter whether
they are just or not, are often enforced by the legal officials and remain valid and
enforceable laws with requisite legal authority. Further, if a person attempts to claim that
she need not obey a human law because it is in conflict with natural law, then she will be
sanctioned nonetheless.
Additionally, Austin criticizes Aquinas’s claim that unjust laws are void because
they do not leave enough room for the lawmakers to use their reason in promulgating
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wise and intelligent rules for the changing circumstances of a community. Lawmakers
would be quite limited in their rule if they had to abide by the restrictions of natural law
and to think otherwise would be confusing legal and moral obligations. In other words,
though legal and moral obligations will sometimes coincide, the necessary connection
advocated by natural law theorists is mistaken.11

III. Austin’s Positivism:
John Austin was one of the first methodological proponents of positivism. His
theory resolves the problems he articulated about natural law theories by appealing to
rules as a species of command. “Laws proper, or properly so called, are commands; laws
which are not commands, are laws improper or improperly so called.”12 Commands can
be general or specific, requiring or prohibiting specific actions under specific
circumstances or general actions under general circumstances. Law can be seen as a kind
of general command which imposes on those under its jurisdiction general obligations to
act or refrain from acting as the law commands. That is, “By every command, the party to
whom it is directed is obliged to do or to forbear.”13 Moreover, duties and commands for
Austin are correlative terms, “the meaning denoted by each being implied or supposed by
the other.” 14 That is, for Austin’s purposes a duty implies a command and a command
implies a duty: given their function in his theory, both are inseparably connected to a
sanction.
Austin, unlike Aquinas, distinguished between moral and legal obligation
asserting that moral obligation is rooted in the commands of God and legal obligation is
rooted in commands of a sovereign. Similarly, if one breaches a moral rule then one is
subject to punishment by God whereas if one breaks a legal rule then one is subject to
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political sanction (punishment by a ruler). Further, Austin asserts that legal obligation
and not moral obligation is the subject of jurisprudence and cites positive law as “the
appropriate matter of jurisprudence,”15 rather than moral law.
Law is positive if it is a command of the sovereign: “Every positive law, or every
law simply and strictly so called, is set, directly or circuitously, by a sovereign person or
body, to a member or members of the independent political society wherein that person
or body is sovereign or supreme.”16 A sovereign, under Austin, is the political ruler of a
specific community whose rules are generally obeyed and who does not generally obey
anyone else (absent, perhaps, God). This sovereign needs no moral justification for his
rule but is in power over the community at issue; his power is illimitable because,
“Supreme power limited by positive law is a contradiction in terms.”17 A sovereign rules
independently of notions of morality and need not necessarily be just in his rule. That is,
there need not be the necessary connection between law and morality as proposed by
natural law theorists.
Another facet of his theory is the important distinction also advocated by Jeremy
Bentham between law as it is and law as it ought to be. The former means there may be
unjust laws in force, though this is a separate question from the latter which prescribes
whether or not laws should be unjust or just (or, for that matter, if they should be any
other way).18

IV. Hart’s Critique of Austin’s Positivism:
H.L.A. Hart criticized Austin’s command theory for a number of reasons.
Austin’s model claims that laymen habitually obey the commands of the sovereign, who
habitually obeys no one. Hart realizes that the term command has numerous connotations
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and is used in many contexts. For this reason, Hart suggests that command theory be retitled coercive orders theory. The simple model of coercive orders considers law as
“general orders backed by threats given by one generally obeyed.”19 This model,
supposedly in its strongest form, was challenged by Hart on at least four grounds: (1) The
content of laws, (2) The range of application, (3) The modes of origin, and (4) The
doctrine of sovereignty.
The content of laws objection simply claims that the model of coercive orders
does not fit a significant portion of laws. He provides the examples of laws pertaining to
the capacity of humans to perform certain actions, such as the signing of a contract or the
witnessing of the signing of a will, both of which must be done by a competent adult. For
instance, laws like ‘in order for a contract to be valid, both parties must be eighteen years
of age,’ or ‘one must be a competent adult to witness the signing of a will,’ contain no
threats of sanctions (no orders-backed-by-threats). Laws such as these do not fit the
coercive orders model.
Two counterarguments are considered by Hart to the content of laws objection:
the legal nullity argument and fragments of laws argument. The former claims that
nullity is a sanction itself, that is, failure to enforce is a punishment itself. The sanction
element, being a necessary component of the orders backed by threats model, is then
fulfilled by the nullity or invalidity of the legal contract or will, etc. Hart disagrees with
this defense because sometimes legal nullity can benefit the person in question, such as
an insane person who is not tried for the death penalty.
The fragments of laws counterargument to the content of laws objection also fails,
according to Hart. This defense claims that under the coercive orders theory a law in its
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complete form always has some sort of sanction attached, otherwise (such as the
examples above), they are just fragments of laws. The moderate version of this
counterargument20 claims that the orders are directed at the citizens and some laws need
to be construed in conditional form, though the criminal law is already in the form of an
order backed by threat. The recasting is limited to rules that confer powers without
associated sanctions. For instance, the law, ‘one must be a competent adult to witness the
signing of a will,’ should be recast as ‘if the will signing is witnessed by a competent
adult…then the executor will give effect to the will.’ The executor, in this instance, is to
apply the sanction of invalidity if the will signing is not witnessed by a competent adult.
Hart rejects this counterargument because it is “distorting the different social functions
which different types of legal rule perform.”21 This recasting of laws not only obscures
laws into an unintended form, but also fails because it is conceivable to have laws
without a sanction attached to them, according to Hart.
Hart’s second objection to the coercive orders model considers that the range of
the application of the law is too broad: legislatures, or those who enact the law, will often
fall under the purview of the laws they enact. “The order backed by threats is essentially
the expression of a wish that others should do or abstain from doing certain things,”22 and
there are only few scenarios that could conceivably fit this model, such as the case of
monarchs or dictators that have absolute rule. Even then, Hart notes, the range of the
application of the law is a matter of interpretation: monarchs and dictators may indeed be
found to fall within its ambit.
The modes of origin objection considers that the coercive orders model does not
take into account customary law that is not enacted formally. “The enactment of a law,
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like the giving of an order, is a deliberate datable act,”23 and such customary law conflicts
with the claim that law resembles orders backed by threats.
Hart addresses two counterarguments to the modes of origin objection. The first
claims that these customary rules are not necessarily law until they are used in litigation.
Hart claims that this objection is dogmatic and does not distinguish between what is
contingent in some cases and necessary in others. That is, it implies that nothing is
necessarily law unless someone has ordered it to be so but, in fact, custom is often
contingently law even before it is ordered in a court.
The second counterargument claims that when custom is law, there is a tacit
(unspoken) order from the sovereign, and thus it fits the orders backed by threat model.
Hart brushes off the idea of a tacit order rather quickly: “in any modern state, it is rarely
possible to ascribe such knowledge, consideration and decision not to interfere to the
‘sovereign,’ whether we identify the sovereign with the supreme legislature or the
electorate.”24 In other words, Hart does not find any merit in the tacit order argument.
As the foundation of the legal system of coercive order theories, the doctrine of
sovereignty is in some way, shape, or form accepted. There, at the head of society, lay a
sovereign: “a person or body of persons whose orders the great majority of the society
habitually obey and who does not habitually obey any other person or persons.”25 Hart
criticizes this doctrine on two grounds: first, its inability to account for the continuity and
persistence of the law, and second, because sovereigns are not illimitable.
Hart claims, through his vivid example of Rex (a sovereign who is recently
deceased), and his successor, Rex II, that there is no way of validating the laws of the
new sovereign. At the death of Rex no one is in the habit of obeying Rex II so he is not
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truly creating laws. To explain how Rex II’s laws can be validated, Hart suggests that we
must look to rules of continuity and succession provided somewhere in the law. Habits
of obedience would not give Rex II the right to rule nor provide validity to his laws, they
are not normative, they would provide no rights, and cannot convey the habit of
obedience from one ruler to another.
Hart also criticizes the doctrine of sovereignty on the grounds that there are
almost no societies under which the sovereign would be considered legally illimitable.
The coercive orders theory entails that the sovereign cannot be limited by its (his/her)
own laws or, at least, does not have to habitually obey its (his/her) own laws. Many
modern legal systems have legislatures that enact or promulgate laws which they have to
habitually obey. Similarly, there are often limits on the legislative power set out in the
constitution or by other governmental bodies. Hart considers that one may reply to this
criticism by claiming that he has misidentified the legislature as the sovereign. If the true
sovereign were identified, then it would turn out that it was the habitually obeyed entity
that never habitually obeys anyone else. This reply, however, does not satisfy Hart
because the legislature, electorate, or who/whatever is identified as the sovereign can be
limited by the constitution or other similar rule-imposing documents. The doctrine of
sovereignty, according to Hart, cannot provide the necessary illimitable sovereign needed
to fit the coercive orders model. Additionally, it has drastic problems with continuity and
succession; these criticisms lead Hart to reject the doctrine as applied to coercive orders
theory and, along with the aforementioned objections, he rejects Austin’s coercive orders
theory itself.
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Chapter II: Hart’s Positivism
Keith W. Diener
I. Hart’s Positivism:
Hart begins his analysis with the traditional Socratic-style question of “What is
law?” –he was not satisfied with the paradoxical definitions provided by judges, lawyers,
and jurisprudents of the time. Law conceived as ‘What officials do about disputes,’26 or,
‘prophecies of what the courts will do,’27 does not satisfy his longing for an adequate
definition of law. These responses do not adequately answer the question of “What is
law?” These answers, according to Hart, merely offer suggestions about different aspects
of the law. Unsatisfied also with a representation of the salient-skeleton features of law
as a definition,28 a compilation of a number of features that pervade legal systems, Hart
identifies three recurrent issues. The answer to these three issues, Hart believes, provides
an answer to the question of law: “How does law differ from and how is it related to
orders backed by threats? How does legal obligation differ from, and how is it related to,
moral obligation? What are rules and to what extent is law an affair of rules?”29 These
recurrent issues are pursued within The Concept of Law, and in their answer Hart has
concurrently developed his theory of positivism.
As Hart mentioned in his analysis of coercive orders theory, the concept of a rule
is key to resolving the problems entailed in Austin’s model. Rather than attempting to
tweak the pre-existing model that is fraught with contradictions, Hart opted to develop his
own rule-based model. Hart distinguishes between two types of rules, claiming that their
union is “the key to the science of jurisprudence,”30 denying Austin’s claim that the
coercive orders model fills this role. Primary rules are the basic type of rule that guide
human action through either telling one what to do or what not to do. They are duty
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imposing and concern actions of humans or changes. Secondary rules clarify, expound,
and are parasitic on primary rules, “for they provide that human beings may by doing or
saying certain things introduce new rules of the primary type, extinguish or modify old
ones, or in various ways determine their incidence or control their operation.”31 They are
power conferring and provide the procedure for creating and varying obligations and
duties.32
Individuals in a society, social group, or similar entity that accept certain rules
and use them to guide their conduct take an internal perspective on those rules. An
observer who is not within the group at issue and merely looks upon the rules from
outside the society has an external perspective on those rules. An external observer is
one who is not engrained in the shared feelings, customs, and morality of a community.
An external observer who remains outside the society without adapting to it cannot
account for how individuals of the rule accepting group identify their own behavior, i.e.
the outsider cannot define their actions in terms of obligations and duties. He will
attempt to define their behavior in terms of generalities and predictions of their conduct;
deviations resulting in a hostile social reaction or punishment. “What the external point
of view, which limits itself to the observable regularities of behaviour, cannot reproduce
is the way in which rules function as rules in the lives of those who normally are the
majority of society.”33 A benefit of Hart’s theory is his account of this distinction
whereas the predictive theory of obligation fails to account for the internal aspect of rules
imposing obligations.
According to Hart, both primary and secondary rules have historical roots; what
Hart calls primitive societies realized the former but not the latter. He analyzes a number
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of defects involved in such societies that do not impose secondary rules, for instance:
solely primary rule societies could only work in small communities that have no
procedure for identifying valid rules, i.e. such a society leads to uncertainty; change
would take place through a very slow and lengthy process, that is, the rules are static; and
the social pressure underlying the rules would be inefficient because the means of
determining when a rule has been violated are unclear and indecisive. Hart suggests that
the remedy for all three defects is to supplement the primary rules with secondary rules,
the latter of which are “about such [primary] rules”.34
To remedy the uncertainty of primitive societies, Hart believes the ‘rule of
recognition’ unifies the system of primary and secondary rules into a system of law, i.e.,
a legal system. This rule will usually reference a writing of some kind as the
authoritative and proper source of identifying valid rules. In the United States, Hart
believes that the Constitution is the ultimate rule of recognition.35 The second defect, the
static quality of primitive societies, can be cured by the introduction of ‘rules of change’.
This type of rule will identify how to change or eliminate existing primary rules and add
new ones, among other things. The third defect is cured through ‘rules of adjudication’ –
these are rules that empower individuals to decide when a primary rule has been
breached, when one has not, and what procedures should be followed in making these
determinations. The combination of theses types of rules are what Hart calls the
‘elements of law,’36 and the ‘heart of a legal system’.37
A legal system must satisfy at least two necessary and sufficient conditions:38 the
rules which are validated by the rule of recognition must be generally obeyed, and the
rules of recognition that specify the other types of rules (those of change and
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adjudication) and provide a method for determining rule validity “must be effectively
accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by its officials,” in order for a
system to be considered a legal system.39 The first condition needs to be satisfied by
private citizens by obedience no matter their motive: whether it is rooted in obligation or
fear, it matters not. The second condition requires that the officials obey the rules and
criticize or perhaps even punish the lapses of other officials from the rules.
After providing the basics of his rule-based theory, Hart analyzes both the open
texture of legal propositions (law) and rule skepticism. Hart first distinguishes between
precedent and legislation as two devices for communicating the law. The former is
usually through some sort of judicial (or in some cases administrative) decision making.
The latter is largely a product of the legislature and the statutes and rules they
promulgate. No matter which device (i.e., precedent or legislation) is employed in the
communication of the laws, there are multiple common threads running between them
including the indeterminacy involved in their interpretation. This indeterminacy, Hart
refers to as the open texture of language and laws. Whether in law or not, “as a general
feature of human language; uncertainty at the borderline is the price to be paid for the use
of the classifying terms in any form of communication concerning matters of fact.”40
Indeterminacy and open texture are directly related to the two handicaps of humans
whenever we attempt to use a general standard without the direction of an official: “our
relative ignorance of fact….[and] our relative indeterminacy of aim,”41 are involved in
deciphering the indeterminacy of language. Given these handicaps, humans must deal
with the open texture of laws for certain instances on a case-by-case basis, striking a
balance between the relative weights of the circumstances. Furthermore, open-texture
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allows judges a limited amount of the use of their discretion in the interpretation and
application of laws in a similar manner to the way that ordinary citizens have to interpret
language generally.

II. Hart Fielding the Objections to his Positivism:
A. Rule Skepticism:
Rule skepticism comes in many forms, though the focus of Hart is on the
moderate version.42 Moderate rule skepticism claims that there are some rules that
constitute the courts, but still claims that law is a prediction of what courts will do.
Moderate Rule skepticism can be resolved with an appeal to the open texture of laws and
language generally as well as to the internal point of view. Moderate rule skeptics could
claim either that law is not truly law until it has been applied by the courts or that statutes
are the source of law: sometimes both. Rules are important because they provide a means
of predicting what the courts will do, but the law is interpreted by the judge no matter
what, so there is not law until this interpretation occurs. This argument, Hart claims,
“ignore[s] what rules actually are in any sphere of real life.”43 If a moderate rule skeptic
were correct, citizens would not be adopting an internal point of view of obligation
imposing rules, nor would they be using them as guides for behavior. In other words, the
moderate rule skeptic’s argument is rebutted by realizing that laws have an open texture
that can be interpreted from an internal point of view and these aspects cannot be
accounted for by the moderate rule skeptic.
B. Moral Objections and Connections:
Hart goes on to develop his ideas through consideration of the questions of justice
and morality and their relationship to the law. Justice, Hart believes, has something more
entailed in it than merely treating like cases alike and different cases differently. There is
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this element of proportion involved but Hart clarifies that it is primarily concerned with
how classes of individuals are treated, rather than an independent individual’s conduct.
However, justice is only one aspect of morality, and is not nearly as broad as morality
itself. Morality has areas of vagueness and open texture, and its status produces much
disagreement concerning where it fits into the human universe of experience and
knowledge.
Hart considers the argument that morality is connected to internality and laws are
connected with externality as ‘confused,’44 nonetheless, he uses it as a basis for
developing four criteria by which Hart distinguishes morality from other social rules and
standards (including legal rules). These four criteria are: “importance, immunity from
deliberate change, the voluntary character of moral offences, and the special form of
moral pressure.”45 First, in contrast to moral rules, other social rules are considered
relatively unimportant. Second, moral rules (or principles) cannot be brought into being
through direct enactment by legislatures, or any sort of direct enactment. Nor can they be
repealed in a like fashion (whereas legal rules can be enacted and repealed through
deliberation). Third, while sometimes legal responsibility will not be exculpated even
when an individual could not help doing what he was doing, in the moral realm this will
almost always act as an excuse. To commit a moral offense one must do it voluntarily,
and the excuse of not being able to help what one is doing will act as a moral excuse,
though not a justification. In the legal realm, however, an individual is often held legally
responsible even if he could not help having broken the law. Finally, there is a difference
in social pressure between legal and moral rules: the former threatens punishment but the
latter appeals to the demands of morality (the moral character of the action). These four
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criteria are used to distinguish a legal rule from a moral principle and likewise, a legal
from a moral obligation.46

19
Chapter III: The Return to Natural Law
Keith W. Diener
I. Dworkin’s Assertion: Moral Principles are in Law:
Ronald Dworkin begins his analysis by outlining three ‘key tenets’ of Hart’s
positivism (that may also apply to other positivist theories). Dworkin takes Hart’s theory
to be, currently, the strongest form of positivism, even stronger than his predecessor,
John Austin’s theory, and thus targets Hart’s version of positivism. The first tenet of
positivism asserts that there are criteria by which a positivist can determine if a legal rule
is valid or not, that is, there are tests of the pedigree of the rule to distinguish between
valid and spurious legal rules. The second tenet claims that if there is not a pedigreed
rule for a certain case, then the judge must use his discretion to determine the law, “which
means reaching beyond the law for some other legal standard to guide him in
manufacturing a fresh legal rule or supplementing an old one.”47 The third tenet asserts
that legal obligation is rooted in valid legal rules, and likewise with legal duties and legal
rights, so the ‘rules’ of the second tenet -decisions made via judicial discretion- are “not
enforcing a legal right as to that issue.”48 Dworkin proceeds to add aspects of Hart’s
theory to this skeleton of positivism, particularly Hart’s distinction between primary and
secondary rules and the difference between rules and orders, in the Austinian sense of the
word. Rules are normative whereas orders are not; orders are binding because they are
the will of the sovereign but rules are binding either because the relevant group accepts it
as binding through their practice or because it has been created and deemed valid in
accordance with the rule of recognition or what Dworkin calls the master rule.
Dworkin introduced his conception of legal principles as another means by which
judges decide cases, other than rules. Dworkin believes that recognizing legal principles

20
as part of a legal system will lead the positivist to give up at least one of their three key
tenets. If the positivist were to attempt to include principles in their system, then they
would have to adjust their first tenet. Positivists would have to find some way of
tweaking the test of pedigree to account for the existence of principles. In so doing this,
however, Dworkin believes that the positivist would be forced to give up the second and
third tenets. In other words, if the test of pedigree is changed to include principles, the
positivist mission would be undermined.
His principles are more flexible and broader than rules, unlike rules, they can be
chosen to be invoked or not by the residing judge. His quintessential examples of
principles are: “no man shall profit from his own wrong” and, “men are free to contract
as they wish”; both of which are sometimes referred to by courts and, or so he claims, are
an alternative basis for judicial decision.49 Dworkin further claims that the notions of
open texture and indeterminacy that Hart claims are involved in rules do not explain the
weight given to principles. Rules are all-or-nothing whereas principles are weighed and if
they are not of equal weight then a judge must decide based on which is ‘heavier’, and
these principles (unlike rules), “survive intact even when they do not prevail.”50 The
difference that principles are weighted and rules are not reveals that they are logically
distinct from rules, the latter of which are either valid or invalid under the master rule
(the rule of recognition). Given his distinction between rules and principles, Dworkin
attempts to use their existence to show a contradiction between the positivist tenets by a
sampling of cases.
In Riggs v. Palmer51 (Elmer’s case), a New York court had to determine if a man
who murdered his grandfather would be able to receive his inheritance as promised in his
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grandfather’s will. The court found that he could not collect his inheritance based, at
least in part, on the aforementioned principle that ‘no man shall profit from his own
wrong.’ Dworkin gives the examples of converse instances where men can profit from
their own wrong showing that the weighted principle still remains intact even when it is
not enforced. For instance, the man who breaks his contract with one employer to take a
higher paying job with another employer is entitled to keep his new salary despite his
breach of contract. Similarly, if a man, in violation of his bail, crosses the state border
and makes a profitable investment in another state, he is not denied the fruits of his gain.
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc.52 is another case Dworkin samples as
containing a number of references to principles including references to the principles of
justice, equitability, and freedom of contract. In this case, a man bought a car from the
dealer with a warranty that limited damages to repair or replacement of the broken part.
The man, shortly thereafter, was injured in a terrible car accident due to defective parts.
The court found based on principles of inequality of bargaining power that it would be
unjust not to allow the man to be compensated for all of his damages.
Plessy v. Ferguson,53 was decided in 1896 by the Supreme Court of the U.S. The
majority stated that the segregated bus and school scheme of the time did not
automatically violate the Equal Protection Clause. The court justified this holding by
stating that the blacks were provided ‘separate but equal facilities’ and segregation as
such was not unconstitutional. Almost sixty years later in 1954, the Supreme Court heard
the question again when a group of black school children challenged the segregation
policies of Kansas schools in Brown v. The Board of Education.54 The court did not
expressly overrule the ‘separate but equal facilities’ provision of Plessy, but rather
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deferred to sociological evidence to show that segregated schools could not be equal
under the Equal Protection Clause. “They pointed out that the phrase “equal protection”
does not in itself decide whether segregation is forbidden or not, that the particular
congressmen and state officials who drafted, enacted, and ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment were well aware of segregated education and apparently thought their
amendment left it perfectly legal…”55 This interpretation, however, led to great
controversy between government officials and laymen alike. The Equal Protection
Clause, Dworkin believes, is a constitutional principle of equality.56
Dworkin says that a positivist may claim either, that principles (such as the ones
portrayed by the preceding cases) are binding in law just like rules, or that principles are
extra-legal standards. By claiming the former the positivist is left with the task of fitting
the latter two tenets with the changed first tenet, a task that Dworkin thinks is impossible.
By accepting the latter, the positivist is left to justify how in cases like Henningsen and
Riggs, a judge can use his discretion to punish individuals when there was no
contemporaneous legal obligation; they would be punished ex post facto. To determine
whether the positivist’s second tenet, the tenet of judicial discretion, can account for this
dilemma, Dworkin further claims that the second tenet is ambiguous because the
positivists pulled the term discretion from ordinary language and he thinks it should be
put back in the context of law, back in its habitat. To do this and to clarify the ambiguity,
he categorizes three senses of discretion.
Discretion in the first weak sense asserts that the standards an official uses
demand judgment, and cannot be applied mechanically: “We use this weak sense when
the context does not already make that clear, when the background our audience assumes
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does not contain…[a] piece of information.”57 In the second weak sense, an official has
final authority to make a decision and this decision cannot be reversed by another
official. “We speak this way when the official is part of a hierarchy of officials structured
so that some have higher authority but in which the patterns of authority are different for
different classes of decision.”58 In the third sense, the strong sense of discretion, the
official is not bound by the standards of the authority (but the authority is still in
existence), “on some issue he [the official] is simply not bound by standards set by the
authority in question.”59 This sense of discretion deals with the range of decisions a
standard purports to control: in the strong sense of discretion there is no standard by
which the official is controlled in the situation at hand. Dworkin then concludes that at
least on some occasions positivists take the term discretion in its strong sense,60 in the
sense that does account for principles, and then examines three routes that a positivist
might take to show that principles do not control the decisions of judges in cases such as
Riggs and Henningsen.
The first alternative a positivist could take is to claim that principles do not give
rise to obligations- that they cannot be binding as rules are. To say that rules are binding
is to say that if a particular rule is applicable in a particular case, it must be followed and
if a judge does not follow it then the judge made a mistake. Principles, though at least in
some cases, do give rise to obligations in some sense of the word, “there is nothing in the
logical character of a principle that renders it incapable of binding him [the judge].”61
Since principles sometimes do give rise to obligations, the positivist could not take the
first alternative.
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Dworkin proposes a second alternative: “A positivist might argue that even
though some principles are binding, in the sense that the judge must take them into
account, they cannot determine a particular result.”62 Principles, or sets of principles,
Dworkin assures us, can determine a result though it is decided in a different manner than
rules. Rules are all-or-nothing whereas principles are weighed and if they are not of
equal weight then a judge must decide based on which is ‘heavier,’ and these principles
(unlike rules) “survive intact even when they do not prevail.”63 And, just as a judge may
be wrong in determining the valid rule, he may be wrong in the weighing of the
principles. Since principles can determine the result of a case at least sometimes,
Dworkin also rejects the second alternative.
The final alternative Dworkin suggests a positivist could take is to claim, “that
principles cannot count as law because their authority, and even more so their weight, are
congenitally controversial.”64 Although the demonstration of the weight and authority of
a principle is controversial, Dworkin appeals to history, practice, legislative history, and
judicial history to show that principles are part of the law despite the fact that they may
be controversial. The controversial nature of principles will later be found to have an
impact on their recognition within the positivist’s master rule.
Having examined three routes a positivist may take to accommodate the strong
sense of discretion with the claim that principles are extra-legal, Dworkin then considers
if the positivist wants to claim that principles are in fact binding in law. If this is so, then
there would be a direct conflict with the ultimate master rule, viz., Hart’s rule of
recognition, because the rule does not account for binding principles, only rules. If the
rule of recognition cannot account for principles being binding then they must be extra-
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legal and yet Dworkin has already shown (or thinks he has shown) that principles are part
of the law and in some instances give rise to obligation (and thus are sometimes binding).
In order to claim that principles are binding as rules, a positivist would have to drop the
second tenet altogether, and will have to devise some test to identify the valid and
binding legal principles such as those in Riggs and Henningsen, and isolate them from the
non-binding principles.
Dworkin says that Hart claims most rules are valid because an institution such as
the legislature enacted them or judges formulated them to decide a case in precedent, and
others, via custom. The former test will not work for principles like the ones found in the
preceding cases because their origin is in some sense of appropriateness developed over
time in the field and through the public. “Their continued power depends upon this sense
of appropriateness being sustained,” and if these principles are not accepted as such they
will slowly shift out of the legal system without ever being decisively overruled or
repealed.65 Dworkin concedes that immense institutional support would add to the
weight of the principles but there is no exact means by which to gauge these principles:
they cannot be placed into one single master rule for recognition given their differences
in nature when compared to rules. Despite this concession, Dworkin believes that the
relationship between principles and institutions is much too indirect for principles to be
recognized under the master rule via their relationship to institutions.
Hart’s alternative means of validation under the master rules claims that “The
master rule…might stipulate that some custom counts as law even before the courts
recognize it….[but] he does not attempt to set out the criteria a master rule might use for
this purpose.”66 If, as the criteria of validity, the master rule were to state that they
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should accept moral rules that the community thinks are morally binding, then the line
between what is customarily a legal rule and what is customarily a moral rule would be
smudged. To say this would be absurd because not all customary moral rules and
obligations are enforced within the law. If the positivist tried to claim that the criteria
should be what the community thinks is legally binding, then the whole purpose of the
master rule would be undermined, “The master rule becomes (for these cases) a non-rule
of recognition; we might as well say that every primitive society has a secondary rule of
recognition, namely the rule that whatever is binding is binding.”67 So, the gateway of
custom is also an infeasible method of accounting for moral principles in the law for the
positivist.
Given that principles cannot fit into law through either of Hart’s gateways,
Dworkin suggests and rejects the idea that the rule of recognition be reformulated as a
principle. He rejects this idea because if the rule of recognition is reformulated as ‘the
complete set of principles in force,’ it results in the tautology, law is law.68 And creating
a list of all of the principles in the jurisdiction would be impossible because they are
numberless and shift so quickly that we could never compose a complete and accurate
list. Thus, Dworkin concludes that if principles are accepted into the positivist’s
framework then their first tenet must be rejected, that of the master rule, which would
also lead to the undermining of the second tenet- judicial discretion. Further, the
acceptance of principles would also undercut the positivist’s third tenet, that obligation is
rooted in rules because principles would (in some sense) also give rise to obligations.
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II. Dworkin’s Moral Theory: Law as Integrity:
A. The Legislative Principle:
Dworkin claims that there are two intertwined, basic principles of the moral
reading, (that is, of law as integrity): the legislative and adjudicative principles. The
legislative principle “asks lawmakers to try to make the total set of laws morally
coherent, and the adjudicative principle…instructs that the law be seen as coherent in that
way.”69 Dworkin believes that the legislative principle of integrity is so entailed in the
modern practice of courts and politics that it cannot be ignored by any interpretive theory
of law. He runs his methodology to determine whether the legislative principle of
integrity fits the modern political system and whether it justifies coercion, or as he has
put it, ‘honors our politics.’70 He concludes that the moral reading both fits the modern
practice of courts and adequately justifies coercion.
In order to fit integrity into the modern political system it must first be seen as an
ideal independent of justice, fairness, and procedural due process because integrity will
often come into conflict with these other principles. For instance, in the sample case
McLoughlin, within which the woman was suing for emotional damages where none had
ever been awarded before, justice could come in conflict with integrity. In this case a
woman came across her dead daughter and severely injured husband soon after a terrible
car accident and wanted to sue for emotional damages caused by seeing them in such an
horrific state. Dworkin believes that in this case a judge could consider it unjust to award
such damages, but pursuant to integrity, the judge will be able to award compensation.
Similarly, except in the strictest type identification of justice and fairness (i.e., claiming
that they are one in he same), conflicts will arise between these ideals as well. It would
be unfair not to compensate her whereas it may be unjust to award such damages.
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Moreover, procedural due process may, in some instances, not be fair or even just. But
for reasons greater than this, Dworkin claims that integrity is an ideal independent of
these others.
He considers this ideal in context of his background assumption that we accept
political fairness, the idea that everyone in (at least a democratic) society should have
their share. Given that every human has at least slightly different moral ideas, legislation
should be seen more as a series of compromises intended to represent all of the opinions
to their respective degrees on the variant issues rather than merely the opinions of the
majority. This legislation in accord with the different moral views produces a
hodgepodge of different laws, or what Dworkin has called a ‘checkerboard solution’.71
This is the very vision of political fairness, according to Dworkin: so, he enquires why is
this ‘Solomonic model’ not generally embraced? It could not be rejected under the
principle of justice because it actually prevents injustices, according to Dworkin’s
conception of justice. That is, it allows everyone their fair share in an opinion on the
issue. The answer lies in the legislative principle of integrity: “The most natural
explanation of why we oppose checkerboard statutes appeals to that ideal….it is
inconsistency in principle among the acts of the state personified that integrity
condemns.”72 So the principle of integrity is the reason why people reject the
checkerboard solution, or so Dworkin says; it is because lawmakers want to make the
laws as morally coherent as possible.
Similarly, as a matter of Constitutional interpretation new decisions must be made
such that they are consistent with other matters of Constitutional law. Dworkin examines
whether abortion should be handed from the federal jurisdiction down to the states for
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them to individually invoke their abortion laws in either their state constitutions or
through statutes. This issue of federalism, Dworkin claims, must be decided by looking
at the U.S. Constitutional scheme in its entirety to determine if it coheres. Dworkin
claims that this is the methodology already used within the realm of Constitutional law.
He believes he has shown that legislative integrity fits our system of laws; moreover, he
finds it an appealing principle that “fuses citizens’ moral and political lives”.73 Given
this assessment, Dworkin surmises that political obligation does not flow from rules per
se, rather from “fidelity to a scheme of principles each citizen has a responsibility to
identify, ultimately for himself, as his community’s scheme.”74
Having shown that law as integrity meets the first, ‘fit’, requirement of his
methodology, Dworkin goes on to conclude that it also gives an adequate account of the
justification of coercion, that is, one that holds absent extraneous and rarely, powerful
circumstances. He goes about the task of showing that integrity justifies coercion by an
analysis of legitimacy, obligation, justice, and community. Legitimacy and obligation go
hand in hand, i.e., “A state is legitimate if its constitutional structure and practices are
such that its citizens have a general obligation to obey political decisions that purport to
impose duties on them.”75 He believes that states that adopt the principle of integrity
have a greater claim to legitimacy than states that do not.76
Dworkin’s theory of political obligation is also called associative (or, communal)
obligation, which “mean[s] the special responsibilities social practice attaches to
membership in some biological or social group, like the responsibilities of family or
friends or neighbors.”77 There are two reasons, Dworkin believes, that philosophers have
ignored this possibility: the first is that there is some presupposition of fiduciaries
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involved that cannot be found in larger communities, and second, because such a vision
of obligation often entails nationalism or even racism. So, in order to accept the
communal obligation at all, one will almost surely accept some notion of reciprocity and
more importantly, what I shall call the ‘Four Dworkinian Musts’: these four combined are
the root of his system of obligation and thus legitimacy, which will simultaneously
provide an adequate justification of coercion.
The four musts are to be resolved in favor of justice over nationalism; and will be
found to play an integral role in Dworkin’s three models of community which are
explicated in the following. First, the individuals of the specific community must hold
each other as fiduciaries, maintaining the obligation to the other members of the group as
inclusively special, excluding those outside the group. Second, each individual must
believe that these responsibilities are between each member of the group in a personal
manner, rather than merely to the group collectively. Third, all of the members of this
group must “see these responsibilities as flowing from a more general responsibility each
has of concern for the well-being of others in the group.”78 Finally, individuals of the
group must have an equal concern, not only a concern, for all of the members of the
group. These four conditions, when they are met, constitute what Dworkin has called a
‘true community,’ which is distinguished from a ‘bare community,’ a community that is
geographically or socially a community without fulfilling these four musts. A true
community, in order to prevent defects of injustice, must be interpreted such that priority
is given to justice over nationalism. This scheme resolves the foregoing reasons that
philosophers have been hesitant to embrace an associative obligation as the family to
which political obligation belongs: it puts justice over nationalism and it relies on a
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conception of community which involves fiduciaries but with a contemporaneous equal
concern for its members.
Dworkin believes that community generally takes priority over fairness or even
justice in that principles of justice and fairness are decided within the context of the
community or group at issue. He believes this is rooted in the idea of a true community
and the task, then, becomes to interpret “what character of mutual concern and
responsibility our political practices must express in order to justify the assumption of
true community we seem to make.”79 Dworkin then discusses three models of
community entailing distinct modes of political association with respective views of the
members towards each other and the community.
Dworkin discerns these three models rejecting the de facto and rulebook models
because they do not abide by the four musts, in favor of the principle model which meets
all four conditions. The first model, the de facto model, treats the community as merely a
de facto historical or geographical accident rather than an associative community.
Dworkin easily disregards this model because it does not fulfill any of the four musts.
The rulebook model, the second model he rejects, “supposes that members of a political
community accept a general commitment to obey rules established in a certain way that is
special to that community.”80 Alas, this model does not fulfill the latter two musts: it
shows neither concern for the individuals of the community nor equal concern.
Dworkin is a proponent of the third model, the model of principle. The
individuals of the community of this model understand and accept that common
principles govern them including the principles of fairness, justice, and integrity, despite
their differences with other communities. Although the model of principle may be open
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to the same problems of injustice that any true community would, it fulfills the four musts
better than any of the alternatives. As such, Dworkin has shown how a community of
principle can defend political legitimacy better than the alternative community models by
placing political obligation within the family of associative obligations. Dworkin notes
that, “This defense is possible in such a community because a general commitment to
integrity expresses a concern by each for all that is sufficiently special, personal,
pervasive, and egalitarian to ground communal obligations according to standards for
communal obligations we elsewhere accept.”81 Thus, Dworkin has shown not only that
the legislative principle of law as integrity fits modern practice but also that it sufficiently
justifies legal coercion via a true community of principle.82
B. The Adjudicative Principle:
Dworkin accepts two principles of integrity, the last subsection covered primarily
the legislative principle that asserts that law should be made in a coherent way by the
lawmakers and this subsection expounds upon the adjudicative principle. The
adjudicative principle asserts that law should be seen as if it was created in a coherent
manner, as if the entire set of laws were created by the same author (of the community
personified). In so doing, judges should identify the legal rights and duties in a like
fashion. Law as integrity recognizes the grounds of law such that “propositions of law
are true if they figure in or follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural
due process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the community’s legal
practice.”83 Dworkin has often phrased this by stating law should be interpreted to be
seen ‘in its best light.’84
The adjudicative principle should be applied regardless of the root of the law: it is
applicable to all types of law including common law, statutes, and the Constitution. For
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example, in McLoughlin, the case where the woman saw her dead child and injured
husband shortly after a terrible accident, the judge should determine how legal practice
would be seen in its best light by determining if the principle allowing emotional
damages would, if accepted by the community, show law in its best (or, at least, a better)
light. This interpretive task is to be seen not as a vertical consistency in principle, but
rather a horizontal consistency of principles that spans the range of presently enforced
community legal standards. This horizontal consistency does not include the entire
history of laws of a country- it does not involve already abandoned laws- it is only
concerned with the laws that are contemporaneously in force in the community. Dworkin
provides an elaborate metaphor comparing judges to a series of novelists who each have
to add a chapter to a novel, each novelist having to interpret the preceding chapters in
order to create the best possible novel. In the process, however, many different
interpretations may arise leading to different authors believing that the book would be
seen best in different lights.
Considering Charles Dickens’s A Christmas Carol, Dworkin provides the
examples of two different explanations for Scrooge being so evil: one is that the evil is by
nature and the other is by nurture. If an author were given only the first few chapters of
this book which did not include Scrooge’s redemption at the end, they could interpret
Scrooge as being naturally evil as easily as they could take it to be due to nurture. If
more of the book were revealed, the interpreter may change his mind and interpret
Scrooge’s evil as caused by nurture by looking more closely at the development of the
literary characters and the nuances of the story. Just as a novelist would look to the
various artistic attitudes in the story, a judge must see the complex structure of the legal
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system. Moreover, there could be any number of interpretations for each controversy that
arises. Dworkin, when speaking of the McLoughlin case (the case where the woman saw
her dead child and injured husband shortly after a terrible accident) provides six
nonexclusive, possible interpretations the judge could adopt.85 The different
interpretations spawn various results as to whether compensation should be awarded for
emotional injury. He concludes that which interpretation the judge chooses depends on
which principles of justice and fairness he adopts according to “a community whose
members have the moral convictions his fellow citizens have,”86 showing the judge’s
commitment to integrity. As such, he will determine which constructive interpretation
best fits and justifies the morality of the community in the unique circumstances of the
case. The fit requirement, Dworkin assures us, is the threshold based primarily in the
judge’s vision of justice; only after considering fit will the judge turn to justification.

C. Dworkin Resolving Objections to Law as Integrity:
The ideal judge who follows Dworkin’s method of constructive interpretation is
called ‘Hercules’ and, having laid out the basis of his theory, Dworkin goes on to fend off
objections to the method of Hercules. Dworkin rebuts a number of objections to his
theory, including: the Hercules is playing politics objection, the Hercules is a fraud
objection, the Hercules is arrogant and anyways a myth objections, and the internal
skeptic objection.87
There are two ways of understanding the ‘Hercules is Playing Politics’88
objection, the objection that claims that by choosing one of the various interpretations
Hercules has ignored precedent and the actual law in order to replace them with his own

35
interpretation. The first understanding of this argument claims that his interpretation
does not fit with the principles of justice and fairness. This understanding of the
argument, Dworkin believes, is only relevant as to single instances, where there is a
misinterpretation of principles by Hercules or he fails to apply his own method properly.
This is not a counterargument to the principle of adjudication as it is only applicable to
the one instance of possible misinterpretation (according to Dworkin); however, the
second interpretation is more plausibly a counterargument to the principle.
The critic of the second interpretation claims that a judge should not rely solely on
his opinion of what would be just or fair, but rather should take on more fundamental
notions of justice and fairness. This critic is claiming that his own notions of justice and
fairness are somehow more appropriate than the judge’s notions, and this would be
hypocritical. Who is this critic to say that his notions of justice and fairness are better
than Hercules’s notions which are based on the community of principle? This entire
understanding of the argument is “an album of confusions,”89 because it attempts to
replace an interpretation of integrity with another interpretation of the criticizing
individual.
The ‘Hercules is a Fraud’90 objection can be rephrased as moral skepticism which
will be dealt with below, or in a weaker version, as we will presently take it. Dworkin
considers that integrity is in play only through Hercules’s laying out the possible
interpretations and then is no longer in force when he picks a particular interpretation. In
other words, when considering the various interpretations involved, Hercules is abiding
by law as integrity but when he picks an interpretation Hercules is no longer abiding by
integrity. Dworkin thinks this implausible because it would corrupt the claim that
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integrity is not involved when justice, fairness, and determining law in its best light are at
issue. This would be impossible if Hercules is truly following the adjudicative principle.
Dworkin combines his next two objections by observing the critics that would
claim ‘Hercules is Arrogant and Anyway a Myth.’91 This critic asserts that Hercules has
no way of proving that his decision is right and it is not fair to accept his decision over so
many other possibilities. Anyways, another critic may state, there is no real-life Hercules
with powers such as this ideal judge. Dworkin responds to the former with the query:
how could this judge following his senses of fairness and justice in accord with coherence
in principle be any less fair than the opinions of another judge without integrity? This
said, he responds to the latter claiming that Hercules is just that, an ideal for other judges
to strive for and is instrumental in our understanding and analysis of the legal structure.
To return to the skeptical arguments, Dworkin may be subject to the internal
skeptic; there are many forms of internal skepticism, two of which Dworkin addresses.
The first is the claim that when faced with two (or more) different interpretations there is
no better way of telling one as more politically moral than the other because both are
incorrect. If this were accepted, Dworkin seems to say, the very idea of a certain kind of
liability would have to be rejected, in which case an interpretation would still have to be
adopted. In other words, one would merely be substituting one interpretation for another.
The second claim of the internal skeptic is not so easily gotten rid of, for it
“attacks the feasibility of integrity at its root.”92 The second argument claims that the
system of laws in practice yields contradictions, so attaining coherence in principle is
impossible. Dworkin resolves this problem by reminding the reader that principles are
weighted and can, in a sense, be seen as competitive rather than contradictory. As such,
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different principles ‘win’ at times and others do not and at these times they are given
priority but there is no contradiction per se.
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Chapter IV: Soft Positivism
Keith W. Diener
I. Hart’s Response to Dworkin:
A. Rules and Principles:
Although Dworkin has criticized Hart for not including moral principles in his
positivism, Hart reflects on his mention of ‘variable legal standards’93 to be an
infelicitously-titled term that considers the same standards Dworkin has titled ‘legal
principles.’ That is, Hart and Dworkin have a terminological difference that Dworkin did
not recognize: what Dworkin calls ‘moral principles,’ Hart has already considered under
the title of ‘variable legal standards’ (although Hart concedes that his theory may have
downplayed the importance of these standards). The difference between rules and
principles include what Hart has termed the non-conclusiveness of principles as opposed
to the near-conclusiveness of rules (there is not an irresolvable logical distinction
between rules and principles as Dworkin would claim). Dworkin was mistaken in
claiming that rules are ‘all or nothing’: that when one rule comes into conflict with
another at least one is bound to win and the other to lose. Hart states that sometimes
rules will come into conflict and when they do the less important rule may still survive
and be found to be more important when applied to another set of facts in another case.
Rules are not ‘all or nothing’ nor are they entirely distinct from principles as Dworkin
claims.
Dworkin’s position is seen as incoherent by Hart who cites Riggs as an example
of when a rule and a principle have come into conflict and the rule remained intact. In
Riggs, a grandson killed his grandfather and wanted to inherit what was bequeathed to
him in his now-deceased grandfather’s will. The rule in this case was found in the statute
which read something like ‘a validly created will that bequeaths inheritance to someone
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will be enforced’ and was outweighed, in Riggs, by a principle. The subject of the will
(the inheritee) killed the testator and the principle ‘no man shall profit from his own
wrong,’ outweighed the rule but the rule still remained in force. If a rule has an all-ornothing character (as Dworkin claims), then it could not have come into conflict with a
principle and remained intact as it did in this case. That is, if rules are all-or-nothing as
Dworkin claims, then it would be impossible for a valid rule to be outweighed by a
principle and still remain in force and yet this is exactly what happened in Riggs. This
incoherence within Dworkin’s view can be cured by admitting that the distinction
between rules and principles is merely a matter of degree and not a logical distinction as
Dworkin claims. Accepting the difference between rules and principles as a matter of
degree also shows that principles can be coherently accounted for within Hart’s theory.
This inclusion of legal principles, Hart notes, is a very important aspect of legal reasoning
and law, and he thinks should have stressed more their ‘non-conclusive force.’94
B. Principles and the Rule of Recognition:
Dworkin’s interpretive approach to a legal system claims that principles are
identified both by whether or not they fit the history of the past law of the institutions of
the legal system and by whether they best justify the history of the past law of the
institutions of the legal system (i.e., justify coercion). Dworkin realizes that there is no
judge in history that has yet adopted such an approach, but he thinks that judges are
attempting to look at things in this fashion and should be interpreted as doing so. This
holistic criterion would, in effect, show law in its best light. Hart believes that Dworkin’s
obsession with defending his view has led him to overlook the fact that some principles
owe their status to their pedigree: to the fact that they have been validated by a rule of
recognition or recognized and adopted by a legal authority.
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Dworkin’s beliefs that principles cannot be recognized by their pedigree and that
a rule of recognition is the only carrier of pedigree criteria are vastly mistaken, according
to Hart. As to pedigree, Hart notes that “there is nothing in the non-conclusive character
of principles nor in their other features to preclude their identification by pedigree
criteria.”95 Provisions of the ultimate rule of recognition may incorporate such flexible
and weighable standards, or at the very least, could be read to contain such principles.
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution that provides freedom of speech is such an
example. Moreover, basic common law principles such as ‘no man shall profit from his
own wrong’ can meet the pedigree criteria of being invoked in a number of different
cases by the courts. Not only are principles consistent with the rule of recognition, Hart
goes so far as to claim that principles as recognized under Dworkin’s interpretive
methodology requires acceptance by the rule of recognition.
Having shown that the rule of recognition is consistent with the existence of
principles in law, Hart further shows that Dworkin’s own interpretive enterprise would be
undercut without the acceptance of the master rule in a legal system. The use of
Dworkin’s interpretive criteria presumes the existence of settled law, for otherwise there
would be no law by which to judge which principles best fit and justify the law. As such,
despite their differences in terminology, Hart believes that he and Dworkin agree as to
how judges identify the sources of law: through a “conventional form of judicial
consensus.”96 Although there is still some disagreement based on their foundational
beliefs about a legal system, at certain points their theories can cohere.
Hart believes that Dworkin is mistaken in thinking that legal rights and duties can
only make sense in the context of law if they are morally justified or grounded. This is
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because they serve the noble function of both providing freedoms and liberties to
individuals while concurrently restraining them. Having asserted that there is a
contingent, though not necessary connection, between law and morality, Hart claims that
the critical difference between the two theories involves the identification of the law.
Under Hart’s positivism, law can be identified by reference to such social sources as
judicial precedent, legislation, and some social customs. Hart’s positivism does not
reference morality nor consider it a necessary aspect of the law: it is only relevant when
the law encompasses moral criteria for identification. For Dworkin, by contrast, morality
plays a role both in identifying and justifying the law. In Hart’s theory, certain
jurisdictions may avail themselves of moral principles in their rule of recognition which
would allow for a connection between law and morality. Given this, Dworkin’s belief
that law must be justified by morality is not necessary as they are already justified by the
rule of recognition.97

II. Soft Positivism:
In the Postscript, Hart asserts that his legal positivism is “the simple contention
that it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of
morality, though in fact they have often done so.”98 This statement, in conjunction with
the conventional acceptance of a rule of recognition, will act as the basic definition of
soft positivism.99 By accepting that there are moral principles within the law, the soft
positivist will be forced to deal with a number of counterarguments and criticisms
(unfortunately, space disallows any such analysis of these arguments here). The primary
question is whether allowing interpretive moral principles into the positivist theory will
undermine the positivist tenets as Dworkin suggests or if soft positivism remains
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coherent? The Dworkinian argument that the following chapter aims to counter is the
assertion that moral principles cannot be validated through Hart’s gateways of either
recognition or precedent. Dworkin’s assertion that principles are innumerous and shift so
quickly that we could never compose a complete and accurate list of them will also be
shown to be mistaken.
I suggest that there are at least two historical roots of moral principles in the law:
criminal law and justice. Further, I claim that other moral principles existing in modern
American law are often the product of transfer, division, or other processes. I will show
that given these two nonexclusive roots, accepting moral principles in the law is coherent
with soft positivism and moral principles are already recognized as valid by either the
rule of recognition or through precedent. This is done without betraying the basic
definition of soft positivism as provided by Hart.
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Chapter V: Two Historical Roots
Keith W. Diener
I. Under Hart’s Wing: A Place for Moral Principles:
A. Introduction:
Moral principles permeate modern American law as Dworkin was kind enough to
point out in his arguments against Hart. Hart explicitly accepts their presence in the law
of the United States and notes that other jurisdictions may have similar moral clauses in
their rules of recognition.100 Hart, however, did not explicate his answer to the question
of where these principles come from and why they permeate modern American laws.
Dworkin would seem to return to a natural law theory claiming that these principles have
always been there and are justified by their appeal to morality. This route, however,
would lead to a circle, spiraling back into natural law theories.101 Rather than accepting
this route, the remainder of this essay will offer evidence as to the two nonexclusive
historical roots of moral principles: justice and the criminal law. If either of these roots is
accepted we will find that Dworkin is mistaken in the need for a moral justificatory
method and that moral principles are already validated (justified) by the methods outlined
by Hart (viz., by the rule of recognition, precedent, or even custom).
B. Two Historical Roots of Principles in the Law:
(1) Justice in the Rule of Recognition:
H.L.A. Hart notes that Justice and substantive moral values are specifically
recognized in the U.S. Constitution; in its Preamble, in fact, the founding fathers stated
one of the primary purposes of the document was to ‘establish Justice.’102 Justice acts,
then, as a validator of moral principles that are governed by justice within the United
States given its explicit reference in the jurisdiction’s rule of recognition.103 A noble
concept, this Justice, whose meaning is not precise or entirely understood: to better
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understand the concept many philosophers have turned to deconstructing the concept
with a number of other concepts and these latter concepts have themselves been further
distinguished. A number of contemporary philosophers accept that justice has a number
of elements and sub-elements. David Schmidtz,104 for example, believes that in order to
determine what is just, one must look to the principles of desert, reciprocity, equality, and
need, and that only then will one be capable of determining what one is due (what is
just).105

(2) Criminal Law Principles in Precedent:
There are a number of cases where moral principles are a basis of judicial
decision and either, such as in England, there is no Constitutional principle of justice or
there is no explaining these principles in terms of the elements of justice. In these cases
we must turn to the second of our historical roots of moral principles in the law: criminal
law.106 The existence of moral principles in other fields absent an appeal to justice is
often a matter of three historical occurrences: the first is through a process I shall call
transfer. This is roughly the product of a judge using his discretion, which, in effect,
transfers the existing moral principle from its root of criminal law into another branch of
criminal law or field of law. Similar processes of the transfer of principles also occur
between fields and branches through legislation. The second is what I have termed the
process of division, that is, the splitting of one field of law into two fields. Through
division, tort law of the United States has made an historical split from criminal law and,
by so doing, has carried with it moral principles into civil law. Similarly, these tort
principles can transfer into other fields and branches just as the principles of criminal law
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have and continue to do.107 Additionally, there are other processes that these moral
principles undergo in time.
II. Four Elements of Justice:108
David Schmidtz believes that the elements of justice can be seen as forming a
metaphorical map which is understood differently by various readers. The elements of
justice can be seen to form a neighborhood rather than a building, that is, they all are
common in many instances but they are not built in as unified a manner as a building is.
As Schmidtz says, “Someone may some day devise a grand unified theory of justice that
answers all possible questions about justice. I do not have such a theory….I argued that
justice is more than one thing, and that the elements composing it are in turn more than
one thing.”109 He believes that there are four elements of justice whose consideration and
weighing can lead to just decisions and actions: desert, reciprocity, equality, and need,
and each of these four elements has correlative subelements. I suggest that their analogue
in the judicial realm would similarly lead to just judicial decisions and laws.
The various elements of justice are to be weighed so that each reader of the
metaphorical map can determine the most just route to take. This weighing will lead to
different results by different readers, which in the realm of law often happens as different
judges come to contradictory decisions and cases are often overruled. Moreover,
Schmidtz’s theory is used instrumentally in the following in order to make the presence
and effect of justice in U.S. judicial decisions easier to understand. This is done by
drawing correlations between the principles exemplified in case law and the elements and
subelements of justice as outlined by Schmidtz. These elements and principles are
generally accepted as core elements of justice and can likewise be considered (at the very
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least for instrumental purposes) to be the elements of justice as they pertain to the laws of
the United States.
Desert: The principle of desert is merely that “People ought to get what they
deserve,” and can be seen from a number of angles.110 Desert can be seen as a
compensatory notion or as a promissory notion. As a compensatory notion, an individual
(X) gives something which shifts the moral scale and then when X is later given
something the scale is rebalanced. Under this vision, X deserves something if it restores
the moral balance or qua reward. As a promissory notion, when X receives something it
shifts the moral scale out of balance. Subsequently, when X proves that he was worthy of
receiving it, the moral balance is returned to equilibrium. For instance, X is given a job
that he did not have the credentials for but after a year he grosses more income for the
company than any other employee. After that year, X would have been deemed to have
deserved the opportunity for the job. These two types of desert are necessary to the
understanding of desert and hence justice.
Reciprocity: Under the heading of reciprocity, there are a number of important
distinctions, though only two will be discussed in the following. First, Schmidtz
distinguishes between symmetrical and transitive reciprocity. Symmetrical reciprocity is
the returning of favors to our original benefactors. This is the ‘canonical form’ that most
laymen would use as a definition. The latter form, transitive reciprocity, is the passing on
of benefits to others based on what one has been given. The philanthropist, for example,
gives to others not because they have given to him but because he has been given so
much. Similarly, if a young college graduate is given a job, he cannot reciprocate by then
giving his hirer a job right out of college (his hirer has been out of college for years), but
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years later the hired is able to give another young college graduate a job. This is
transitive reciprocity: it is honoring a favor rather than returning it.
The second major reciprocity-related distinction Schmidtz draws is between
reciprocity qua restraint and reciprocity qua value. He argues that reciprocity qua value
is the means within a social structure that we distribute to produce citizens willing and
able to reciprocate- “to participate in the patterns of mutual recognition.”111 Reciprocity
qua restraint, on the other hand, as applied to a social structure would distribute benefits
according to (or proportionate to) those who contribute to the social structure.
Equality: Schmidtz makes the point that there are a number of different types of
equality: equality of opportunity, economic equality, equal pay for equal work, equal
shares of distribution, etc. All of these different types of equality are necessary to the
consideration of what is both equal and just, though no type seems to reign supreme in
the world of justice.
Need: There is a hierarchy of needs, according to Schmidtz, under which some
needs become more important with their urgency. He mentions the work of Abraham
Maslow, who says “there is a hierarchy of needs, with physiological needs forming the
base of a pyramid and spiritual transcendence forming the apex, with safety, belonging,
esteem, and self actualization forming some of the intermediate levels….Part of
Maslow’s point is that context determines which needs are most urgent.”112 Schmidtz
seems to agree with this idea but goes further in claiming that the most important needs
can be fulfilled by being good neighbors, developing a strong economy, taking
responsibility for our own actions, and to realize and embrace our human fallibility.113
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Need, equality, reciprocity, and desert are the four major elements under which
Schmidtz has built his conception of justice and they should be invoked and weighed
when considering what one is due. These four elements comprise the first historical root
by which principles are found in American law, viz., justice.

III. Division of Criminal and Tort Law:
In the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, “they [criminal law and torts]
have started from a moral basis, from the thought that some one was to blame.”114
Centuries before the U.S. was established, in Medieval England, there was no distinction
between tort theory and the criminal law; it has only been in relatively recent times that
they have formed into different fields with both different substance and different
procedures. In Medieval England there was a criminal remedy known as the ‘appeal of
felony’ that resolved what would in modern terminology be considered a ‘tort,’ which
literally translated from the French is a ‘wrong’: both words are the same as the Latin
delictum, which was the word used to signify these wrongs in ancient times.115 These
wrongs of the ‘appeal of felony’ included ‘physical assaults and other invasions of
personal interests.’116 A tort theorist, Thomas A. Street states, “During the whole of the
past history of English common law there has, of course, been an abundance of legal
rules concerning those wrongs which are now treated under the head of torts…”117
Street, who was writing on the topic in the early twentieth century, believed that tort
principles were aimed at balancing in favor of justice.118 Moreover, he believed in an
evolution of tort principles over time. Over the centuries that followed the common law
remedies, civil tort remedies developed from criminal law and eventually it morphed into
its ever-changing modern system of tort law. This historic split of criminal law and torts
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into two separate fields and correlative procedures is what I have termed division.119
Division has similarly taken place as tort law has rapidly expanded in the contemporary
technological age. For instance, many fields of law such as Family law and Workers
Compensation law were originally a part of tort theory and as the laws for these areas
expanded they eventually broke off into separate fields of law from their tort origins.
Though their tort roots are prevalent in almost every statute or precedent based decision,
the laws of these fields have expanded until a point of break with the traditional tort law.
Some characteristics of these fields remain obvious even today, for example, the
fields of criminal and tort law both refer often to the question of reasonableness as
determined by either the judge or a jury; it must be considered along with the capacity of
the alleged criminal to commit such actions.120 Tort theory contains flexible standards:
would a reasonable person in the position of X have done Y? Similarly, in negligence
theories a duty of some kind must be breached in order for a defendant to be found liable
(along with a breach of this duty, causation, and damages) and at times, this duty can be
of both moral and/or legal nature. Moreover, tort theory has questions such as: was X
wrong for doing Y? Within tort theory, moral principles are found both as a standard of
determining liability and as an instrument for deciding adequacy of the actions of an
individual.
Analogously, in criminal law the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution asserts
that searches and seizures must be deemed reasonable. It guarantees that: “The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated…”121 These searches and seizures can be
deemed unreasonable on many grounds, such as the failure to attain a warrant when
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needed (the violation of the Constitutional guarantee) or if the officers conducting the
search violate other contitutional or procedural guarantees. At times, the search could be
found unreasonable in a similar manner to the actions of the reasonable person
exemplified in tort theory above. For instance, if the officers conducting the search tore
down an unlocked door or smashed a number of glass windows, the decision-makers
would look to standards of both morality and reasonableness to determine if the actions
of the officers were reasonable or not in lieu of deeming the action unreasonable due to a
breach of a different procedural or constitutional safeguard. In other words, both torts
and criminal law contain similar standards and involve both the looking to moral
principles and an appeal to them in existing law which both direct subjects to look to
moral principles and to provide answers to otherwise unkown questions.
Further, tort law and family law often contain similar standards and ideals (or,
elements). For instance, in tort law there is fault and no-fault liability: the former
involves the aforementioned duty, breach, etc. whereas the latter has no such elements
(defendants are held strictly liable). The analogue in family law is the distinction
between fault and no-fault divorce: the former requires breaches of duties and the latter
does not. Moreover, other similar standards permeate both fields though these standards
have morphed over time in different directions due to their prior division. The preceding
are just a few examples of the process of division as it has occurred in American law.
IV. Transference of Tort and Criminal Law Principles:
Transfer explains how moral principles can seep into fields of law that are
traditionally non-moral. There are two methods of transfer of moral principles: the first
method is that legislators take it upon themselves to transfer moral principles from
criminal law, its branches, or the fields that are the product of its division in order to
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make new laws. For instance, a moral principle that was once accepted only in tort theory
can become part of contract law via new legislation. The second method is through
adjudication: this method shows that transfer plays a role in judicial discretion. The
judges use their discretion, in order to make a just judicial decision, and take tort
principles, principles of criminal law, or their product and transfer them into another field
or branch.
Aside from transfer and division there are certainly a number of other processes
that moral principles undergo within the law although they are not discussed here. For
now, I will leave this category open under the heading of ‘other processes.’ These
processes of moral principles that include transfer and division can also be applied to
rules, though likely to a lesser extent (i.e., when a field divides both principles and rules
divide with it and often rules are transferred from one field to another via legislation and,
less often, through discretion). Since rules, to a lesser extent, also undergo these
processes, the difference between rules and principles is not one of logical distinction,
rather merely of degree (that is, perhaps principles undergo these processes to a greater
extent than rules).
V. Dworkin’s Sample Cases:
Dworkin’s sample cases exemplifying principles in the law can be explained in
terms of justice and criminal law principles. As such, they are explained in terms of
validation under the rule of recognition and through precedent. In showing this, Hart’s
theory is shown to have adequately and coherently accounted for moral principles in
American law.122

52
In Dworkin’s first sample case, Riggs v. Palmer123 ( Elmer’s case), a New York
court had to determine if a man who murdered his grandfather would be able to receive
his inheritance as promised in his grandfather’s will. The court found that he could not
collect his inheritance based, at least in part, on the principle that ‘no man shall profit
from his own wrong.’ Dworkin claims that this is a clear case of when a court has
rendered a decision based on a weighted principle. This principle, however, is rooted in
compensatory desert: if the man was allowed to profit from his own wrong then it would
shift the moral scales out of balance and justice would not be served. Such compensatory
desert is an element of justice and as such the judge in Riggs was ensuring that the
constitutional moral principle of justice would be ensured.
Riggs could also be explained in terms of criminal law principles. The principle
‘no man shall profit from his own wrong’ is not a principle that was pulled out of thin air,
but rather has been preserved in precedent over the centuries and was transferred into the
laws of wills in this instance to prevent a man from inheriting when he had killed the
testator of the will.
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc.124 is another of Dworkin’s sample cases;
he notes it contains a number of references to principles including references to the
principles of justice, equitability, and freedom of contract. In this case a man bought a
defective automobile which had a limited warranty, and soon thereafter got into a horrible
car accident because the automobile was defective. The court agreed that the plaintiff
should not be limited to recovering the damages of the warranty because of unequal
bargaining power, that is, the dealer took advantage of the man in having him sign such a
slanted contract. Dworkin claims that involved in this case are several moral principles
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and he is correct, although, once again principles such as ‘freedom of contract’ and
‘inequality of bargaining power’ are principles rooted in justice. Freedom of contract
spawns from the equality element of justice, specifically, equality of opportunity.
Moreover, the ‘inequality of bargaining power’ could fall under either the equality
element (ensuring economic equality), the reciprocity element (ensuring reciprocity qua
value), or even under the need element (ensuring people get what they need while not
being taken advantage of). The opinion of Henningsen specifically noted that this case
was, at least in part, based on concerns of justice: “’[I]s there any principle which is more
familiar or more firmly embedded in the history of Anglo-American law than the basic
doctrine that the courts will not permit themselves to be used as instruments of inequity
and injustice?’”125 This assessment of the opinion furthers the evidence that the decision
of this case was partially based on the Constitutional principle of justice.
Moreover, Henningsen could also be explained in terms of the division and
transfer of criminal law principles as well as justice. Although the principle of freedom
of contract is based in justice, there are tort laws (which have divided from criminal laws)
preventing corporations from selling faulty merchandise. Product liability is sometimes a
strict liability offense, meaning that the dealer is held fully responsible for all costs
incurred or damages rendered by the buyer of the goods based on the defective parts
without a showing of fault. Similarly, the buyer in this case was allowed to recover even
though there was no express law stating it per se. In this case, the tort principle allowing
the buyer to recover damages was transferred into the contract law of automobile sales.
The ruling of this case was then justified under the precedent of tort law and the justice of
the rule of recognition.
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Dworkin’s next sample case is rooted in justice. Plessy v. Ferguson,126 was
decided in 1896 by the Supreme Court of the U.S. The majority stated that the
segregated bus and school scheme of the time did not automatically violate the Equal
Protection Clause. The court justified this holding by stating that the blacks were
provided ‘separate but equal facilities’ and segregation at that time was not
unconstitutional. Almost sixty years later in 1954, the Supreme Court heard the question
again when a group of black school children challenged the segregation policies of
Kansas schools in Brown v. The Board of Education.127 The court did not expressly
overrule the ‘separate but equal facilities’ provision of Plessy, but rather deferred to
sociological evidence to show that segregated schools could not be equal under the Equal
Protection Clause. “They pointed out that the phrase “equal protection” does not in itself
decide whether segregation is forbidden or not, that the particular congressmen and state
officials who drafted, enacted, and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment were well aware
of segregated education and apparently thought their amendment left it perfectly
legal…”128 Whereas Dworkin believes the judges are changing their minds over a
general principle of equality, they are really discussing the element of justice, equality.129
All of the preceding cases have been explained in terms of the Constitutional
principle of justice and/or the principles of criminal law. Justice is in the rule of
recognition which is one of Hart’s means of validation of law and the criminal law
principles are preserved in precedent, another of Hart’s means of validation of law.
Having shown how Dworkin’s sample cases can be explained in terms of justice and
criminal law principles, we have also shown how Dworkin’s sample cases can be
explained in terms of the theory of Hart without any inconsistency.
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VI. Objections to the Two Historical Roots:
A. Flexibility of Justice Unfathomable:
There are two forms of this objection: the first claims that the Schmidtzian
conception of justice is by no means what the framers of the Constitution of the United
States had in mind when they stated in the Preamble that they were attempting to
establish justice. Such a deconstruction of justice is a product of modern thought and was
not the intent of the framers. The second objection claims that the principles are overly
flexible and could be used to explain almost anything.
The first objection has merit, however, I have argued elsewhere130 that there are
many benefits to reading the original meaning of the Constitution. A more intratextual
look at the Constitution reveals that, though it may not have been phrased in this manner,
a similar conception of justice to the one provided by Schmidtz is what the framers meant
when they stated ‘Justice.’ The complete Preamble is as follows: “We the People of the
United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.”131 All of the elements of justice are
required to fulfill the noble mission stated by the framers in the Preamble of the U.S.
Constitution. Ensuring the general welfare, liberty, and posterity also includes
establishing justice: ensuring that people get what they need, what they deserve,
reciprocating with them, and ensuring as much equality as possible. Moreover, if one
does not agree that these elements are necessary aspects of Justice, then I suggest one
merely use them instrumentally to better understand and explain what might be meant by
justice.
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The second objection is barely even worth mentioning. The flexibility of justice
is exactly the point: the principle of justice is broad and contains many elements and
subelements which explains the confusion between natual law theorists and positivists.
Natural law theorists think that many aspects of morality are entailed in the law when
many of these aspects are just elements of justice.
B. Begging the Question as to Roots:
Well, a critic may say, you are just begging the question. When asking where
these principles come from you are saying they come from the criminal law but there is
nothing to lead me to believe that they are not coming from some natural law source.
You are, in fact, begging the question as to their roots.
There is a difference that this critic does not realize between evidencing the fact
that these principles have existed in the many fields of law and have undergone many
processes for centuries on end and begging the question of where they come from. These
moral principles are present in American law either because they are rooted in Justice or
because they have undergone processes rooted in a criminal law that came from the laws
of countries that were in existence long before the United States (or because of some
other unexamined historical root). Moreover, since we are primarily concerned with
American law which is largely rooted in English Common law, one can truly say that in
America these criminal law principles are rooted in a law that was in force before the
founding of the United States. The principles came from English common law and have
been preserved in precedent ever since this time: where they came from before that is a
question I will not attempt to answer here.
C. Begging the Question as to Validity:
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This natural law critic claims that the source of legal validity is not necessarily
drawn from the fact that there are moral clauses in the U.S. Constitution (i.e., Justice).
The natural law critic asserts that the question as to the validity of these moral principles
is being begged, they need not be in the rule of recognition in order to be considered
valid. Such a critic would claim that there are general moral principles whose validity is
due to their universal nature (or some sort of communal acceptance as Dworkin would
advocate). This alternative explanation provided by the natural law critic is, itself,
begging a number of questions as to both validity and roots. Furthermore, the criteria
provided by the rule of recognition perfectly well explains the validity of these principles
without an appeal to these abstract principles which are largely a relic of a past, though
not forgotten, age.

D. Controversial Nature of Moral Principles:
Some may claim that allowing these principles into the theory of positivism will
lead to the downfall of the positivist theory. Moral principles are by nature controversial
and since the master rule has to be accepted by convention, they are not accepted by
convention (which entails consensus). This critic’s argument leads to a very important
point: the controversial nature of moral principles does not prevent their recognition by
the population of the jurisdiction. Whether or not they agree as to the meaning of a moral
principle in their rule of recognition, the important thing is that they agree that this moral
principle is in force because it is in the rule of recognition or precedent.132
E. Positivism is a Misnomer:
Others may claim that moral principles and positivism do not mix: to call a legal
theory positivist is to imply that there is no necessary connection between law and
morality. In reply one will recall our basic definition of soft positivism, it is “the simple
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contention that it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain
demands of morality, though in fact they have often done so,”133 along with the
conventional acceptance of a rule of recognition. The italicized phrase solves the
apparent confusion of this critic: although there is no necessary connection between law
and morality, there is a connection in some jurisdictions. There may be a necessary
connection between the law of some jurisdictions and morality, though law itself is only
contingently connected to morality (i.e., all of the jurisdictions who recognize moral
criteria or principles could fall leaving only jurisdictions that do not recognize moral
criteria).134 This is still a positivist theory though the theorists are analyzing the U.S., a
jurisdiction where the law as it is today sometimes does satisfy the demands of morality
(but other jurisdictions do not). And if the critic is not happy with this response, then he
can freely call it something else, perhaps, the theory of H.L.A. Hart.

VII. Conclusion:
Dworkin is mistaken in asserting there is a contradiction within positivism if
positivists allow moral principles into their theory of law. These principles are already
recognized either in the rule of recognition via justice or through precedent via the
historic principles of the criminal law having undergone division, transfer, and other
processes as well as through their product. These principles are a part of the law and are
not dependant on moral justifications, rather on their validation under one of Hart’s
gateways. Additionally, these principles are not necessarily numberless and can be traced
historically to their roots as has been evidenced here.135 Hart’s theory, with a little
elaboration, can fully and completely account for the existence of moral principles in the
law without betraying any of its other tenets.
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This idea of obligation, as it is distinguished from being obliged, is an important point of Hart’s theory.
He analyzes this distinction, once again, by first criticizing Austin’s definition of obligation and he uses
this distinction to further distinguish between the internal and external perspectives. To be obliged,
according to Hart, is to believe that some harm or punishment of sorts will come upon oneself if one does
not obey. This is a largely psychological state of mind that refers to the motives and beliefs by which one
does something or refrains from doing something. Hart’s definition of being obliged is similar to the
Austinian definition of an obligation (obedience brought about by orders backed by threats), though the
latter is seen in more of a predictive context focusing on the chance or likelihood that someone will suffer
the punishment of others if they do not fulfill this obligation.
Hart criticizes the Austinian notion of obligation, obligation as derived from the command of the
sovereign, on two grounds: the first is that this definition obscures the rationale that the breaking or
deviating from the rules is a justification for the punishment rendered. That is, to have an obligation is
more than just a prediction of punishment rendered by others in the deviation from the rule. It is also a
justification for the punishment in the event of a breach of the rule imposing the obligation. Secondly, Hart
criticizes Austin’s predictive interpretation because: “If it were true that the statement that a person had an
obligation meant that he was likely to suffer in the event of disobedience, it would be a contradiction to say
that he had an obligation, e.g. to report for military service but that, owing to the fact that he had escaped
the jurisdiction, or had successfully bribed the police or court, there was not the slightest chance of his
being caught or made to suffer. In fact, there is no contradiction in saying this, and such statements are
often made and understood” (Hart 84).
Hart goes on to explain that to have a legal obligation implies the existence of a rule but every rule
does not necessarily impose an obligation. Rules are spoken and conceived of as obligation imposing when
one is brought to conform to these rules via a social pressure demanding conformity (i.e., rules are
linguistic). If one fails to conform, a negative social reaction is presented towards the deviator. The more
serious this social pressure and consequent reaction, the more likely the rule is to give rise to an obligation.
Hart then considers a possible reply from proponents of the predictive theory; one such individual would
claim that the predictive theory gives within the definition of obligation a central role for hostile social
reactions and punishment. So the added requirement of a rule imposing obligations is really just a
superfluous addition to the predictive theory. Hart rejects this reply by contrasting between the internal and
external perspectives (aspects) of rules.
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sheeplike; the sheep might end in the slaughter-house. But there is little reason for thinking that it could
not exist or for denying it the title of a legal system” (Hart 117).
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jurisdiction to courts. It is not possible for a theory to both deny the possibility of determining what courts
will do while claiming that law is a prediction of what courts will do, according to Hart, this is incoherent.
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very unrealistic manner elements in a social structure which function in an identical way in the lives of
those who live by it” (Hart 182), and such a dissection would be impracticable as Hart would like to keep
the inquiry broader.
In response to the formality charge, Hart conceded that there is a minimum necessary content to
law that derives from naturally necessary truths about humans. This is opposed to a conceptually necessary
content which he does not advocate. He does this through an analysis of natural law theory which claims,
‘that there are certain principles of human conduct, awaiting discovery by human reason, with which manmade law must conform if it is to be valid” (Hart 186). As such, survival is often the aim and if laws and
morals do not have any content then this minimum purpose of survival will not be forwarded. “In the
absence of this content men, as they are, would have no reason for obeying voluntarily any rules…” (Hart
193)Hart sees a minimum content of the teleology of natural law, that all men usually want to survive, is
composed of five truisms: human vulnerability, approximate equality, limited altruism, limited resources,
and limited understanding & strength of will. The first truism, human vulnerability, realizes that humans
are vulnerable to attack, death, injuries, etc. The second truism, approximate equality, explains that, despite
our slight differences in intelligence and physical qualities, all humans are roughly equal. Limited altruism,
the third truism, explains that men are neither devils nor angels and are prone to care more about
themselves and their family than others- although sometimes they do care about others. The fourth truism
accepts that the world has a limited amount of food, land, and other resources. Finally, the fifth truism
explains that men are not perfect in their use of intellect and will but sometimes make mistakes. These
truisms combine to provide a minimum content to rules, such as the “minimum forms of protection for
persons, property, and promises” (Hart 199), according to natural law theorists.
Hart concedes that some of the beliefs of natural law claiming that this minimum content is a
matter of “natural necessity” (Hart 199), are correct because laws often do portray morals. However, as a
product of conceptual analysis, morality is not conceptually necessary to law.
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The positivists claim that a judge does not have any discretion when there are clear, valid rules
established, that could be applied to the case at hand. Nominalists would claim discretion is always used
by judges even when a clear, valid rule could be applied to the case, they would thus advocate discretion in
the second weak sense. They are proponents of the view that judges are the final arbiters of the court, and
no one would have any authority to overturn a decision of the highest court. The second weak sense,
however, could not be what the positivists have in mind because there is no need for discretion in cases
where the rule is well established and available, thus the rule would be the final authority rather than the
judge. A positivist could not claim that they mean to use discretion in the first weaker sense either.
Although this may be an appealing option given that Hart, for example, notes the open texture of some
legal rules, and that judges will sometimes disagree over these indeterminate rules, Dworkin shows that if
discretion is used in the first weak sense, it would lead to a tautology. “The proposition that when no clear
rule is available discretion in the sense of judgment [the first weak sense] must be used is a tautology”
(Dworkin 32). Moreover, this tautology is not an insight and cannot account for legal principles except if
they designate them as extra-legal, according to Dworkin. If this is so, then the positivist would still be left
with determining the justification of punishment ex post facto.
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As usual, Dworkin first takes on the competitors’ conceptions of legitimacy, rejecting the Rawlsian
approach because it lacks genuine consent and does not allow the individuals to be free from the sovereign.
However, even if Rawls’s overall conception of legitimacy is rejected, one may still claim that his duty to
be just holds strong. Dworkin points out that it does not, “tie political obligation sufficiently tightly to the
particular community to which those who have the obligation belong” (Dworkin 193). In other words,
Rawls’s duty to be just does not show how a particular member of a community (or state) has a duty to
support the institutions of that community (or state). Rawls’s conception does not show that citizenship is
the root of this legitimacy.
Dworkin’s second competitor for providing an account of legitimacy consists of the ‘fair play’
arguments, which he rejects as quickly as the Rawlsian approach. This line of argumentation comes in
many forms including: if someone has been subject to the protection, support, and other benefits of the state
then they are also to accept the burdens whether these burdens are taxes, laws, or anything else. Often in
judicial argumentation, particularly concerning matters of personal jurisdiction, a defendant will claim that
he was not subject to the court’s jurisdiction when he was served process in the jurisdiction. Such ‘tagging’
is justified by a fair play argument which claims that while within the borders of the state, whether a
resident of that state or not, because the individual is incurring the benefits of the state they must also be
subject to the court’s jurisdiction (which would, to many defendants, seem like a burden given rise from
political obligation) (I thank Dean Roy Sobelson for pointing out to me the prevalent use of the fair play
justifications in the modern judiciary in cases such as ‘tagging’ in his Civil Procedure course.)
Despite its prevalent use in the modern judiciary, Dworkin finds the fair play argument to be
rebutted by two counterarguments. Primarily, it is rejected because not everyone would agree to the
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exchange: it assumes that obligations can be incurred by those who would not desire what they have been
given. Secondarily, and perhaps more importantly, the fair play argument is ambiguous in its use of the
term ‘benefit’. It is impossible to consider if the person would be better off in many senses of the word
‘better’, if the political institutions were not present. It would be a very weak principle indeed if it was
only examined under the state of nature par of Hobbes, that is, better than a war of all against all. And if it
were interpreted otherwise, a similar impasse of ambiguity would result: there is no telling if a citizen
would truly be better off or not without the benefits of the state.
It is only after rejecting the fair play and Rawlsian conceptions of political obligation, Dworkin
goes on to develop his own theory of political obligation as a form of associative (communal) obligation.
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Having done this he notes the addendums to clarify that integrity is not always achieved perfectly,
particularly under the adjudicative principle there are many inconsistencies and the entire body of law
cannot magically be converted into one coherent vision. Moreover, Dworkin explains that integrity is not
synonymous with consistency because, in order to make the principles cohere, the institutions will depart
from the doctrine of stare decisis in order to maintain fidelity to the principles (i.e., coherence in principle
trumps consistency in judicial decision).
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Jules Coleman also defends soft positivism against Dworkin’s arguments, see:
Coleman, Jules, The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory, Oxford
University Press, 2003. Jules Coleman, when considering Dworkin’s argument that moral principles lead
to a contradiction between the positivist’s tenets, stated that “no one nowadays considers this argument
convincing,” (Coleman, 105) though its importance to modern jurisprudence is unquestionable. Dworkin’s
argument spawned a dichotomy of positivist views: the exclusive (hard) legal positivists deny that moral
principles can be validated by their mention in the rule of recognition whereas inclusive (soft) positivists
allow for such a validation. Hart, like Coleman, is an inclusive positivist as he explicitly allows for the
existence and recognition of moral principles in the rule of recognition of certain jurisdictions.
The inclusive (soft) positivist, according to Coleman, draws the distinction between the content
and the grounds of the criteria of validity. The grounds must be a convention by officials but the content
need not state specifically social facts or sources: inclusive positivists allow for morality to be a condition
of legality, although it need not be a condition, it can be. And, whether or not morality plays a role in
validation depends on the structure and content of the rule of recognition per each jurisdiction. The U.S.,
for example, explicitly recognizes moral principles in their Constitution, whereas other countries may not.
Moreover, some countries may only recognize the validity of moral principles based on their social sources,
and some based on both their rule of recognition and their social source.
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interpretive natural law theorist. See: Altman, Andrew, Arguing About Law, pgs 49-70.
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The fact that justice is specifically referenced in Constitution (the rule of recognition), gives it the
function attributed to it by the writers of the rule. This function of Justice as referenced in the rule of
recognition is clear, the Constitution was written (in part) to ‘establish justice’. Justice could then easily be
seen as a kind of ‘catch all’ in the United States’ Constitution that all the laws enacted under the
Constitution and its laws must likewise ‘establish Justice’.
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Schmidtz, David, Elements of Justice, Cambridge University Press, 2006. See also, David Miller who
has a similar conception of justice which accepts need, desert, and equality, but not reciprocity as the
elements of justice: Miller, David, Principles of Social Justice, Harvard University Press, London, England,
1999.
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Schmidtz’s elements can be used here instrumentally in order to explain cases in terms of justice which
could not as easily have been explained in the absence of such a deconstruction. It is used here to make
justice’s role in legal dispute more easily understood. The assumption that his theory is infallible should
not be adopted but it is nonetheless vitally important to realize and accept its instrumentality.
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These criminal principles sometimes overlap with the principles of justice, but I believe that they are
broader than the principles of justice as they often refer to aspects of morality that may exceed justice.
Moreover, these principles of the criminal law (and punishment) are often justified under retributivism
which would fit nicely into Schmidtz’s theory of justice (i.e. the element of justice, desert). However,
sometimes they are justified under a utilitarian view, which would at times exceed the boundaries of justice
and creep into the realm of other aspects of morality (besides justice).
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species of law though they may carry similar elements, they are distinct with different subject matter and,
sometimes, different procedures. Fields include the commonly accepted categorizations of law (i.e.,
Criminal Law, Torts, Contract Law, Property Law, etc.). A branch, in the sense in which it will be used
here, is a sub-field or a field within a field. Branches can also be seen as entities that have yet to complete
the process of division, but perhaps they never will and they will remain a branch of the field forever.
Although this distinction is somewhat fuzzy at times, only a moderate understanding is necessary to
understand the roles of branches and fields of law in transfer, division, and other processes.
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Dworkin gave a limited response to Hart in: Dworkin, Ronald, Book Review: Thirty Years On: The
Practice of Principle: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory. By Jules Coleman, Harvard
Law Review, April 2002. Historically, according to Dworkin, positivism has been a political tool used
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as having diminished with the severe technological and sociological changes that have taken place over the
course of the last century or so. It was used by such Judges as Oliver Wendell Holmes and Learned Hand
to justify highly controversial decisions with appeal to the authority of law (Dworkin, 1677) Nonetheless,
Dworkin portrays modern positivism as a guild whose members are deferring to once great philosophical
ideas that have no place within the larger social and political realm. There are few, if any, ties between the
narrow field of conceptual positivism and the broader spectrum of political philosophy. Positivism, as
Dworkin states, is a relic of a past age whose modern academic contenders have shifted the meanings of
positivism’s terminology to such an extent that the few theses that were traditionally held of the greatest
import have been betrayed by their own theorists.
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I realize that this is highly unlikely, but it is possibility. Alternatively, the U.S. could rewrite its
Constitution without any reference to morality and begin its entire legal process over without any reference
to morals. If this happened then it would be apparent that law (as a concept) has no necessary connection
to morality although the law of the U.S. as it is today is connected to morality.
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Custom is another means of validation under Hart but there is no space to address this topic here.

66

Bibliography
Altman, Andrew, Arguing About Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy, 2nd Ed.,
Wadsworth Publishing Company, 2001.
Areen, Judith, Family Law: Cases and Materials, 4th Ed., Foundation Press, New York,
1999.
Aquinas, Thomas St., Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. Vernon J. Bourke, vol. 4, Notre
Dame Press, 1975.
Aquinas, Thomas St., “Summa Theologica”, In Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas,
ed. Anton C. Pegis, vol. 2, N.Y., Random House, 1945.
Austin, John, “The Province of Jurisprudence Determined”, In Lectures on Jurisprudence
or the Philosophy of Positive Law, Ed. Robert Campbell, 4th Ed., Vol. 1,
Spottiswoode and Co., London, 1879.
Bergson, Henri, Creative Evolution, Dover Publications Inc., New York, 1998.
Bix, Brian, Jurisprudence: Theory and Content, 3rd Ed., Carolina Academic Press,
Durham, N.C., 2004.
Burley, Justine, Dworkin and His Critics, Blackwell Publishing, 2004.
Coleman, Jules, Hart’s Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law,
Oxford University Press, 2001.
Coleman, Jules, The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal
Theory, Oxford University Press, 2003.
Diener, Keith, “Constitutional Interpretations and the Benefits of Meaning Originalism,”
Dialogue, Volume 48, #2-3, April 2006.
Dressler, Joshua, Understanding Criminal Procedure, 3rd Ed., LexisNexis, 2002.
Dworkin, Ronald, A Matter of Principle, Harvard University Press, 1985.
Dworkin, Ronald, Book Review: Thirty Years On: The Practice of Principle: In Defense
of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory. By Jules Coleman, Harvard Law
Review, April 2002.
Dworkin, Ronald, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the Constitution, Harvard
University Press, 1996.

67

Dworkin, Ronald, “The Judge’s New Role: Should Personal Convictions Count?” The
Journal of International Criminal Justice, April, 2003.
Dworkin, Ronald, Law’s Empire, Harvard University Press, 1986.
Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press, 1978.
Edmundson, William A., and Golding, Martin P., The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy
of Law and Legal Theory, Blackwell Publishing, 2005.
Edmundson, William A., Hart and His Critics, forthcoming.
Glannon, Joseph W, The Law of Torts, 2nd Ed., Aspen Publishers, 2000.
Hart, H.L.A., and Honore, A.M., Causation in the Law, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1959.
Hart, H.L.A., The Concept of Law, 2nd Ed., Oxford University Press, 1997.
Hart, H.L.A. ‘Criminal Responsibility’, in Punishment and Responsibility, Oxford, 1968.
Hart, H.L.A., ‘Elimination of Responsibility,’ in Punishment and Responsibility, Oxford,
1968.
Hart, H.L.A., Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Theory, Oxford
University Press, 1982.
Hart, H.L.A., Law, Liberty, and Morality, Stanford University Press, CA, U.S.A., 1963.
Hart, H.L.A., The Morality of the Criminal Law: Two Lectures, Oxford University Press,
1969.
Hart, H.L.A, “Problems of the Philosophy of Law”, in Essays in Jurisprudence and
Philosophy, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983.
Hart, H.L.A., “Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment,” in Proceedings from the
Aristotelian Society, New Series: Vol. LX, 1959-1960, Harrison and Sons, 1960.
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, The Common Law, Harvard University Press, 1963.
Franklin, Marc A., and Rabin, Robert L, Tort Law and Alternatives: Cases and
Materials, 7th ed., Foundation Press, New York, 2001.
Lacey, Nicola, A Life of H.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, Oxford
University Press, 2004.

68

Klenk, Virginia, Understanding Symbolic Logic, 3rd Ed., Prentice Hall Inc., 1994.
Raz, Joseph, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics,
Rev. Ed., Oxford University Press, 2001.
Raz, Joseph and Hacker, P.M.S., Law, Morality, and Society, Oxford University Press,
1977.
Salzburg, Stephen A., and Capra, Daniel J., American Criminal Procedure: Cases and
Commentary, 7th Ed., Thomson West Pub., 2004.
Sullivan, Kathleen M., and Gunther, Gerald, Constitutional Law, 15th Ed., Foundation
Press, New York, 2004.
Schmidtz, David, Elements of Justice, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Street, Thomas Atkins, The Theory and Principles of Tort Law, Beard Books,
Washington D.C. 1996.
U.S. Constitution available at: http://www.usconstitution.net/const.html

